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Brady is the Problem: Wrongful
Convictions and the Case for “Open
File” Criminal Discovery
By BRIAN GREGORY*
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespec-
tive of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
—Justice William O. Douglas, Brady v. Maryland1
There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal
case, and Brady did not create one . . . .
—Justice Byron White, Weatherford v. Bursey2
Introduction
BRADY V. MARYLAND remains the Supreme Court’s strongest artic-
ulation of a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to evidence of
his or her innocence. In this regard, the “Brady rule” is widely consid-
ered to be our criminal justice system’s primary mechanism for pro-
tecting the wrongfully accused from conviction, imprisonment, and
even execution. In recent years, however, the advent of DNA technol-
ogy and studies by legal and scientific scholars have shown that wrong-
ful convictions have persisted at an alarming rate since the Court’s
decision in Brady. In fact, in the vast majority of exonerations it is the
case that the prosecution, law enforcement personnel, or both pos-
sessed undisclosed evidence which would tend to prove the innocence
of a particular defendant.
The extent of the problem of wrongful convictions in the Ameri-
can criminal justice system demands radical solutions. The United
* J.D. Candidate, University of San Francisco School of Law, 2012; B.A., University
of California at Berkeley, 2004. The author would like to thank Richard A. Leo, whose
dedication to the study of wrongful convictions inspired this Article, John P. and Lois
Gregory for their invaluable encouragement and support, and Kathleen M. McBride and
the rest of the staff of the University of San Francisco Law Review.
1. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
2. 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
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States incarcerates more people, both in total and per capita, than any
other country in the world, including Russia and China.3 In 2008, it
was reported that 2.3 million American adults were incarcerated in
American prisons and jails—one in every one hundred American
adults.4 In 2009, it was reported that 5.1 million American adults were
under some form of correctional supervision, including prisons, jails,
probation, parole, and other forms of non-custodial sanctions—one
in every thirty-one American adults.5 In 2007, commentator D.
Michael Risinger published the most comprehensive attempt to date
to determine an “empirically justified factual wrongful conviction
rate.”6 Basing his study on capital rape-murder cases, Risinger deter-
mined a conservative estimate of that rate to be 3.3%.7 If this number
is an accurate estimate of the national rate of wrongful conviction,
regardless of the nature of the charged crime, it would mean that
there are approximately 80,000 wrongfully convicted individuals incar-
cerated in prisons and jails and 168,300 wrongfully convicted individu-
als under some form of correctional supervision.
While some have argued that wrongful convictions are actually
more likely in capital cases, such as those used by Risinger to determine
his wrongful conviction rate,8 a generous reduction of the rate still
produces staggering estimates of the number of wrongfully convicted.
If Risinger’s rate is reduced from 3.3% to 1% to account for the
greater likelihood of wrongful conviction in capital cases compared to
other crimes, it would still mean that there are approximately 23,000
wrongfully convicted individuals in American prisons and jails and
51,000 wrongfully incarcerated individuals under some form of cor-
rectional supervision.
Though these studies do not represent a complete picture of the
true extent of the problem of wrongful convictions in the American
3. CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, U.S. RATES OF
INCARCERATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2006), available at http://nccd-crc.issuelab.org/sd
_clicks/download2/us_rates_of_incarceration_a_global_perspective_focus.
4. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN
AMERICA 2008 (2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/
8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf.
5. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/
uploadedFiles/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf [hereinafter ONE IN 31].
6. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 768 (2007).
7. Id. at 768–80.
8. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996).
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criminal justice system, they do suggest that wrongful convictions oc-
cur far more than anyone believed possible, until relatively recently.
Due to the herculean nature of the task of reviewing every conviction
in the United States, a truly comprehensive rate of wrongful convic-
tion may never be known. The available data certainly demonstrates
one thing, however—the growing tendency of the United States to use
criminal prosecution to solve social ills is producing large numbers of
wrongful convictions. Even if it is eventually determined that the rate
of wrongful convictions is very small in relation to the overall convic-
tion rate, the total number of the wrongfully convicted in the Ameri-
can criminal justice system is likely, at least, in the tens of thousands.
Because of the Supreme Court’s decree that “there is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case,”9 the Brady rule
remains an innocent defendant’s best hope of ensuring that evidence
of his or her innocence will come to light and ensure a correct verdict.
The available data and above estimates of the rates of wrongful convic-
tion suggest that this hope is misplaced, however, and that the Brady
rule has failed to protect factually innocent defendants. Instead, the
current construction of the Brady rule facilitates the suppression of
evidence of most causes of wrongful conviction. Further, the illusory
protection of the rule legitimizes wrongful convictions and under-
mines the credibility of the criminal justice system by lulling the pub-
lic into a false sense of security that prosecutors will turn over all
exculpatory evidence, thus obscuring the problem.
The following is an examination of the operation of the Brady
rule as a safeguard against wrongful conviction in the modern crimi-
nal justice system, including the evolution of the Brady rule, the cumu-
lative effect of subsequent rulings on the rule’s operation, and
proposed changes to criminal discovery practice aimed at minimizing
wrongful convictions. This examination ultimately reveals that the
Brady rule offers no meaningful protection of a defendant’s constitu-
tional right to due process of law. As currently interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, the Brady rule does not apply to the vast majority of
criminal prosecutions, and even when applicable and properly fol-
lowed, it allows for widespread suppression of exculpatory evidence.
Moreover, the absence of meaningful consequences for prosecutorial
violations of the current construction of the Brady rule renders the
remainder of the rule’s force moot. The end result is that, contrary to
its original purpose, Brady actually facilitates the suppression of a
9. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
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number of different types of exculpatory evidence commonly associ-
ated with wrongful convictions. Consequently, the Brady rule could be
said to represent the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions.
While some state and local jurisdictions have adopted rules re-
quiring more extensive prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evi-
dence than is called for by the current construction of the Brady rule,
Brady and its progeny are still accepted as the baseline articulation of
the extent to which a defendant is constitutionally entitled to exculpa-
tory evidence in a criminal case. To effectively reduce the rate of
wrongful convictions, this Comment proposes a comprehensive over-
haul of criminal discovery practice. A system of “open file” discovery
in criminal cases would go far to remedy the problems with respect to
wrongful convictions that have manifested as a result of the modern
interpretation of the Brady rule.
I. Report—The Evolution of the Brady Rule
A. Brady v. Maryland
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense was based on a
defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law.10 The Court set
forth a broad rule requiring the disclosure of all exculpatory evidence
in the possession of the prosecution: “We now hold that the suppres-
sion by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon re-
quest violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.”11
Brady is not a case of wrongful conviction, but it is a classic exam-
ple of prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence.12 Brady and
his accomplice, Boblit, were charged with first-degree murder in con-
nection with a robbery that they committed together.13 Significantly,
the two men were tried separately.14 In Maryland at the time, first-
degree murder in connection with robbery was punishable only by
death or life imprisonment.15 At his trial, Brady admitted his involve-
ment in the crime, asking the jury only that he be spared death and
sentenced to life imprisonment on the grounds that it was Boblit who
10. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
11. Id. at 87.
12. See id. at 84–85.
13. Id. at 84.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 85.
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did the actual killing.16 Prior to Brady’s trial, his attorney requested
that the prosecution disclose all of Boblit’s out-of-court statements re-
garding the crime.17 The prosecution allowed defense counsel access
to every statement but one—the one in which Boblit admitted he did
the actual killing.18 Brady was convicted and sentenced to death in the
absence of this crucial piece of exculpatory evidence.19
In deciding Brady, the Court heavily relied upon its prior decision
in Mooney v. Holohan,20 which held that due process barred the prose-
cution from obtaining a conviction through perjured testimony:
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for
misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the
accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but
when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly . . . . A prosecu-
tion that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if
made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty
helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts
the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does
not comport with the standards of justice, even though, as in the
present case, his action is not “the result of guile,” to use the words
of the Court of Appeals.21
But while the Warren Court’s original understanding and articulation
of the Brady rule promised defendants nearly complete access to ex-
culpatory information, subsequent Court decisions have consistently
restricted and narrowed the rule set forth in Brady in ways that have
fundamentally altered a defendant’s due process right to exculpatory
evidence. Notably opposing the Court’s due process interpretation of
a defendant’s right to exculpatory information was Justice Byron
White, who viewed the Court’s emphasis on due process as improper
and saw it as “cast[ing] in constitutional form a broad rule of criminal
discovery.”22
B. The Brady Rule Since Brady
By 1977, the makeup of the Supreme Court had changed, and
with it, the Court’s approach to a defendant’s right to exculpatory
evidence. Considering Justice White’s objection to the majority rule in
Brady, it is likely no coincidence that he delivered the opinion of the
16. Id. at 84.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 84–85.
20. 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam).
21. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88 (quoting Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 169 (Md. 1961)).
22. Id. at 92 (separate opinion of White, J.).
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Court in Weatherford v. Bursey.23 Justice White did not miss the oppor-
tunity to bring Brady into line with his views regarding a defendant’s
right to exculpatory evidence via due process: “There is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not
create one . . . .”24 To this end, the Court moved further to restrict
criminal discovery, holding that “[i]t does not follow from [Brady] . . .
that the prosecution must reveal before trial the names of all witnesses
who will testify unfavorably.”25
In United States v. Bagley,26 the Court held that a defendant’s con-
stitutional right to exculpatory information under Brady is violated
“only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression un-
dermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”27 In setting forth
this standard of “materiality” with respect to Brady, the Court approv-
ingly noted that this was the same standard set forth to determine
ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington,28 decided
just one year prior.29
It is also important to note that the Court in Bagley expressly re-
jected the notion that there is a material difference between “im-
peachment evidence” and “exculpatory evidence.”30 While the Court’s
primary purpose in rejecting this distinction was to correct the under-
lying court of appeals’ reasoning that gave priority to impeachment
evidence for Brady purposes, the lack of a distinction was to later be-
come highly significant after the Court’s decision in United States v.
Ruiz.31
In Kyles v. Whitley,32 the Court further heightened the standard of
materiality that must be met under Bagley to find a violation of a de-
fendant’s constitutional right to due process.33 In addition to basing
their analysis on the question of whether a particular piece of sup-
pressed exculpatory evidence might have produced a different out-
come at trial, the Court held that this determination “turns on the
cumulative effect of all such evidence suppressed by the govern-
23. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
24. Id. at 559.
25. Id.
26. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
27. Id. at 678.
28. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
29. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681–82.
30. Id. at 676 (“This Court has rejected any such distinction between impeachment
evidence and exculpatory evidence.”).
31. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
32. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
33. Id.
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ment.”34 The Court explicitly acknowledged that the definition of ma-
teriality articulated in Bagley and heightened in Kyles “must
accordingly be seen as leaving the government with a degree of discre-
tion” and that a “showing that the prosecution knew of an item of
favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a
Brady violation.”35 The Court also unequivocally put prosecutors in
charge of determining when exculpatory evidence rises to a level of
materiality wherein failure to disclose would deprive the defendant of
a fair trial: “[T]he prosecutor remains responsible for gauging that
effect.”36
In United States v. Ruiz, the Court held that “the Constitution does
not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evi-
dence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defen-
dant.”37 This holding is especially significant considering the fact that
the vast majority of criminal cases are currently resolved by plea bar-
gain in both federal and state courts.38 While some have argued that
the Court’s decision in Ruiz applies only to “impeachment evidence,”
the Court previously held in Bagley that there is no “such distinction
between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence [for the
purposes of Brady].”39
Finally, in 2011, the Court decided Connick v. Thompson.40 Connick
is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wherein the plaintiff
Thompson alleged that his civil rights were violated due to the prose-
cution’s failure to turn over exculpatory information in his underlying
prosecutions for robbery and murder. Thompson won a $14 million
jury verdict at the district court level, which the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals later affirmed.41 The Supreme Court held that in order to
find a prosecutorial agency or municipality civilly liable for violating
Brady, a plaintiff must show a “pattern of similar constitutional viola-
tions,” which could establish “deliberate indifference” on the part of
the municipality regarding the need to train its attorneys in the nu-
ances of Brady.42 The Court held that Thompson had not shown such
34. Id. at 421.
35. Id. at 437.
36. Id. at 421.
37. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
38. See Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, 2012 WL 932020, at *6 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (rec-
ognizing that pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions).
39. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
40. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
41. Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009).
42. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360.
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a pattern and reversed the Court of Appeals, stripping Thompson of
his award for damages.
The majority’s finding that the facts in the record of Connick fail
to establish a “pattern” of Brady violations, which indicate the neces-
sary “deliberate indifference” on the part of a district attorney re-
quired to trigger civil liability under § 1983, significantly raises the bar
for finding liability for municipalities and prosecutorial offices that
violate Brady.
II. Analysis
A. The Cumulative Effect of Brady and Its Progeny
1. Brady Is Not Applicable to the Vast Majority of Criminal
Prosecutions
As discussed above, the Court in Ruiz held that “the Constitution
does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment
evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defen-
dant.”43 Prior to the Ruiz decision, the Court held in Bagley that “[t]his
Court has rejected any . . . distinction between impeachment evidence
and exculpatory evidence.”44 The validity of this holding was later
cited by the dissent in Connick.45
The combined effect of these holdings is that the Brady rule does
not apply to any case resolved through a plea bargain. It is widely rec-
ognized that the vast majority of cases in federal and state criminal
courts end in plea bargain prior to trial. Although this Comment does
not attempt a comprehensive national review of plea bargaining rates
vis-a`-vis the total number of prosecutions nationwide, statistics com-
piled by the Supreme Court of the United States and the Judicial
Council of California (“Judicial Counsel”) offer an illustrative glimpse
of the pervasiveness of the practice of plea bargaining in the Ameri-
can criminal justice system. According to the Supreme Court,
“[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent
of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”46 According to the
Judicial Council, only 3% of all California’s criminal cases go to trial.47
43. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633.
44. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.
45. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1381 n.16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
46. See Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, 2012 WL 932020, at *6 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (rec-
ognizing that pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions).
47. KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009 at 12 (2010), available at http://law.
scu.edu/ncip/file/ProsecutorialMisconduct_BookEntire_online version.pdf.
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Of the remaining 97%, 70% of all misdemeanor cases and 80% of all
felony cases are resolved in a plea bargain.48 The remaining cases are
disposed of via acquittal, dismissal, or transfer.49 If the statistics of the
Judicial Council even remotely reflect the national rate of plea bar-
gaining (and there is no reason to believe they do not), the implica-
tions are staggering: prosecutors are under no obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence in the overwhelming majority of criminal
prosecutions.
Compounding this problem, especially with respect to wrongful
convictions, the Supreme Court ruled in Bordenkircher v. Hayes that a
prosecutor may legally threaten a defendant who wishes to go to trial
with severely harsher penalties in order to induce a guilty plea.50 In
Bordenkircher, the Supreme Court observed that “[d]efendants advised
by competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards
are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to
prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-con-
demnation.”51 Bordenkircher was decided in 1978; Ruiz in 2002.
Bordenkircher’s assumption that defendants are necessarily well-in-
formed in accepting a plea bargain is simply not accurate after the
Ruiz Court’s approval of this type of prosecutorial coercion.
Taken together, Bagley, Bordenkircher, and Ruiz have created a real-
ity in which prosecutors are free to make threats of long prison
sentences or even death to induce a guilty plea, while under no obli-
gation to reveal evidence or information which would tend to show
the defendant’s innocence. These circumstances may lead even wholly
innocent defendants to plead guilty in order to avoid the risk of con-
viction at trial.
2. Even When Prosecutors Comply With Brady, the Current
Formulation of the Brady Rule Allows Prosecutors to
Legally Suppress Exculpatory Evidence
Even when prosecutors are in full compliance with the Brady rule,
the current construction of the rule allows for the legal suppression of
exculpatory evidence. In particular, the Supreme Court’s rulings in
Kyles v. Whitley and United States v. Bagley have made Brady an ineffec-
tive protection of due process even when followed properly. In defin-
ing the meaning of the term “material” as used in the central holding
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
51. Id. at 363.
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of Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court has raised the standard of
exactly how “exculpatory” a piece of evidence must be to warrant dis-
closure to the defense: failure to disclose must “deprive the defendant
of a fair trial.”52
This articulation of “materiality” is notable as it conflicts with the
facts of Brady itself. In articulating a defendant’s due process right to
exculpatory evidence in Brady, the Court did not find that but for the
prosecution’s suppression of exculpatory evidence, there would have
been a different outcome at Brady’s trial. Rather, the Brady Court re-
versed the trial court’s decision with respect to the sentencing phase of
the proceeding.53 The underlying verdict of the guilt phase of the trial
was left untouched. These facts imply that prosecutorial suppression
of exculpatory evidence is a violation of a defendant’s due process
rights, even in the event that it would not necessarily produce a differ-
ent outcome at the guilt stage of a trial. As such, the Court’s ruling in
Bagley stands in direct contradiction with the original holding of
Brady, which demanded that the prosecution disclose all exculpatory
evidence “material either to guilt or punishment.”54
In Kyles, the Court affirmed Bagley and added that materiality for
the purposes of Brady should be based on the cumulative effect of all
exculpatory evidence and that the prosecutor alone shall determine
materiality. The Kyles Court explicitly condoned the suppression of
exculpatory evidence in holding that a “showing that the prosecution
knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense does
not amount to a Brady violation.”55 Compounding this, the Court held
that this determination of materiality to be made by prosecutors and
reviewing appellate judges must consider “the cumulative effect of
[exculpatory] evidence suppressed by the government.”56 While on
the surface it may appear that this holding strengthens Brady in that it
demands that prosecutors take a comprehensive look at all the availa-
ble information in a case to determine materiality, it also deem-
phasizes the importance of any one piece of evidence for the purposes
of the Brady rule.
By carving out space within the Brady rule for the legal suppres-
sion of exculpatory evidence, the Court has struck a severe blow to the
central meaning of Brady’s due process protection. Under its current
52. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
53. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
54. Id. at 87.
55. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
56. Id. at 421.
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construction, the Brady rule makes a prosecutor the sole arbiter of
what evidence should be disclosed to a defendant. Although an appel-
late judge may review this determination after a conviction, defend-
ants are by that point already being subjected to the consequences of
conviction. Essentially, this leaves prosecutors free to act as discovery
referees in criminal cases, with no other party—usually including the
judge—reviewing their work to determine whether or not they accu-
rately determine the materiality of any exculpatory evidence. The cur-
rent Brady rule ignores the reality that the significance of a piece of
evidence obtained in the course of an investigation is largely in the
eye of the beholder. A piece of evidence which may not appear to be
significant to one investigator may have great significance to someone
with a different perspective on a case.
In addition, the current rule forces prosecutors and appellate
judges to engage in speculation, before trial and on appeal respec-
tively, as to whether disclosure of a piece of evidence would “deprive
the defendant of a fair trial.”57 It is realistically impossible for a prose-
cutor to accurately predict the reaction of a jury to every piece of evi-
dence one hundred percent of the time, just as it is entirely impossible
for a judge to look back on every trial and surmise the potential im-
pact of each piece of suppressed evidence with perfect accuracy.
While prosecutors and judges are generally endowed with above-aver-
age intelligence, wisdom, and extensive legal training, prescience is
generally not required to obtain either office. Under Bagley and Kyles,
the legality of suppression of exculpatory evidence turns not on the
tendency of the evidence to exculpate the defendant, but instead on
the subjective interpretations of imperfect human beings asked to per-
form a task of which no human is capable of performing in every case.
As a result, there are bound to be cases in which legally suppressed
evidence would have impacted the outcome of a trial but for the in-
correct judgment of a prosecutor or appellate judge.
Bagley and Kyles also alter the original meaning of “materiality” as
articulated in Brady in that, instead of materiality being determined in
the sole context of whether the evidence is “favorable to an accused,”
such evidence must now be weighed for the purposes of materiality in
relation to the rest of the government’s case. Essentially, to determine mate-
riality, the prosecutor must examine whether he or she has a strong
enough case to win at trial in spite of any exculpatory evidence.
Viewed in this light, the Brady rule adds nothing to the prosecutor’s
57. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.
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determination of the materiality of exculpatory evidence. In fact, one
can safely assume that if the cumulative effect of all exculpatory evi-
dence in a given case rises to the level of materiality articulated in
Bagley and Kyles, there would be no prosecution in the first place.
3. Lack of Meaningful Enforcement Has Rendered the Brady Rule
Moot
The Supreme Court does not “assume that prosecutors will always
make correct Brady decisions.”58 In fact, in Connick v. Thompson, Justice
Scalia admitted that “Brady mistakes are inevitable.”59 Unfortunately
for defendants who happen to be innocent of the crimes with which
they are charged, the lack of meaningful enforcement of the Brady
rule by the courts, coupled with the near total absence of correspond-
ing repercussions for prosecutors who violate Brady, renders the rule
itself moot.
a. State Bar Discipline
In Connick v. Thompson, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority,
noted: “An attorney who violates his or her ethical obligations is sub-
ject to professional discipline, including sanctions, suspension, and
disbarment.”60 While this assertion may be true in theory, it does not
bear out in reality. According to the Northern California Innocence
Project (“NCIP”), discipline of prosecutors by the State Bar of Califor-
nia is virtually non-existent.61 NCIP reports that between 1997 and
2009, there were 4741 public disciplinary actions reported in the Cali-
fornia State Bar Journal.62 Only six of those actions involved a prosecu-
tor in a criminal case.63 In that same time period, there were 707 cases
in which prosecutorial misconduct was expressly found by a reviewing
court.64 If these numbers bear out, it would mean that prosecutors are
disciplined in less than 1% of the cases where prosecutorial miscon-
duct is discovered. The actual percentage rate of cases of state bar
discipline for Brady violations is probably lower than 1% since, by their
very nature, Brady violations can go undetected altogether.
58. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1364 (2011).
59. Id. at 1367 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1362–63 (majority opinion).
61. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 47.
62. Id. at 16.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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In 1999, Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley of the Chicago Trib-
une published the findings of their study of wrongful convictions
caused by Brady violations for the period between 1963 and 1999.65
Despite finding 381 wrongful homicide convictions alone during that
period, Armstrong and Possley could not find even one prosecutor
who had been disbarred for violating Brady in any type of criminal
case.66
b. Lack of Civil or Criminal Liability for Individual Prosecutors
Beyond state bar discipline, individual prosecutors are also insu-
lated from civil liability when they violate Brady. The Supreme Court
held in Imbler v. Pachtman that “a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity
from [civil] suits for damages when he acts within the scope of his
prosecutorial duties,” and noted that “this immunity does leave the
genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecu-
tor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.”67 Im-
bler also explicitly held that absolute immunity to civil liability for
prosecutors extends to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.68
Prosecutors also have little to fear in the way of criminal repercus-
sions for violating Brady. Commentator Sara Gurwitch has noted that
“[w]hile state penal laws contemplate the prosecution of prosecutors
who violate Brady, they are so infrequently enforced that the possibil-
ity of prosecution barely warrants a mention.”69 In her survey of crimi-
nal prosecutions of prosecutors for Brady violations, Gurwitch was able
to locate only two instances of such actions, one in 2007 and one in
1981.70 Even in those cases, the criminal sanctions imposed were nom-
inal: a $500 fine in one case, and a 24-hour term of incarceration in
the other.71
In Armstrong and Possley’s study of wrongful convictions, none
of the prosecutors involved in the 381 wrongful homicide convictions
they discovered were criminally prosecuted.72 The only examples of
65. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999,
at C1.
66. Id.
67. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420, 427 (1976).
68. Id. at 427.
69. Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in
Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 303, 318
(2010).
70. Id. at 303, 319 nn.73 & 75.
71. Id. at 303, 318, 319 n.75.
72. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 65.
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such prosecutions found by Armstrong and Possley involved two attor-
neys involved in a rape case and a robbery case, respectively.73 Both
prosecutors received $500 fines.74
c. Lack of Civil Liability for Prosecutorial Agencies and
Municipalities
It is further clear that the threat of civil liability for government
agencies and municipalities does not act as a deterrent to Brady viola-
tions. As breathtakingly illuminated by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Connick v. Thompson, it is possible to sue government agencies and
municipalities for Brady violations, but the standard for proving liabil-
ity has been set so high as to be nearly impossible to meet.75
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “pattern” as “[a] mode of
behavior or series of acts that are recognizably consistent.”76 Viewed in
this light, it is surprising that the Court in Connick failed to see a pat-
tern in the facts of the case as represented in the record. In fact, the
record reveals that incidents of Brady violations at the Orleans Parish
District Attorney’s Office (“OPDAO”) “were neither isolated nor atypi-
cal.”77 It is undisputed in Connick that the prosecutor, in violation of
Brady, suppressed blood evidence which eventually conclusively exon-
erated Thompson.78 Eventually, it was revealed that a total of ten sepa-
rate pieces of exculpatory evidence were improperly suppressed by
OPDAO.79 This suppression took place over a period of nearly twenty
years, of which Thompson spent eighteen in prison—fourteen of
those years on death row—and came within one month of execu-
tion.80 That period of time included multiple trials and appeals. “[N]o
fewer than five” prosecutors at OPDAO either knew about or were
directly involved in the suppression of exculpatory evidence.81 Fur-
ther, in the ten years prior to Thompson’s initial trial, “Louisiana
courts had overturned [at least] four convictions because of Brady vio-
lations by prosecutors” at OPDAO, and the jury at Thomson’s retrial
“heard testimony that [OPDAO] had one of the worst Brady records in
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See supra Part I.B.
76. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1242 (9th ed. 2009).
77. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1370 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1371 (majority opinion).
79. Id. at 1376 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Thompson’s defense was bolstered by . . .
ten exhibits the prosecution had not disclosed when Thompson was first tried.”).
80. Id. at 1370; id. at 1355 (majority opinion).
81. Id. at 1384 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the country.”82 OPDAO’s abysmal record on Brady prompted Orleans
Parish Judge Calvin Johnson to send a letter to Connick, warning that
he would take the extraordinary step of reporting Connick’s Assistant
District Attorneys to the state bar disciplinary board if they did not
improve in observing the Brady rule.83 Further, the Supreme Court
had, by the time of Connick, already issued another landmark decision
regarding the Brady rule on another case out of the same office, while
headed by the same district attorney.84
In addition to all this, there is strong evidence in the record that
the critical blood evidence which exonerated Thompson was inten-
tionally suppressed in bad faith. The dissent notes that “Deegan, the
assistant prosecutor in [Thompson’s] trial, learned he was terminally
ill. Soon thereafter, Deegan confessed to his friend Michael Riehlman
[another OPDAO assistant prosecutor] that he had suppressed blood
evidence in [Thompson’s] case.” Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito,
and writing separately for the purpose of attacking the dissent, cites
Deegan’s bad faith in an attempt to shield OPDAO from liability:
“The withholding of evidence in [this] case was almost certainly
caused not by a failure to give prosecutors specific training, but by
miscreant prosecutor Gerry Deegan’s willful suppression of evidence
he believed to be exculpatory, in an effort to railroad Thompson.”85
Although the Supreme Court did not hold OPDAO liable for what
happened to Thompson, six of the nine justices found that bad faith
was involved in the suppression of evidence that led to his wrongful
conviction.
If the facts of Connick do not establish a pattern showing deliber-
ate indifference to Brady violations, one must wonder if there ever can
be a scenario of systemic prosecutorial misconduct egregious enough
to trigger municipal liability.
d. Ineffectiveness of Elections
The fact that most district attorneys are publically elected is also
ineffective as a means of ensuring that the Brady rule is observed.
There are numerous high-profile cases of district attorneys who, ei-
ther through incompetence or bad faith, obtained wrongful convic-
tions through Brady violations and were re-elected after the defendant
82. Id. at 1360 (majority opinion); id. at 1384 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 65.
84. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
85. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1368 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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was exonerated and the prosecutor’s mistake or malfeasance had
come to light.
Harry Connick, Sr., former Orleans Parish District Attorney (and
father of famed jazz singer Harry Connick, Jr.), owns the distinction of
heading an office with such a poor record on violating Brady that the
Supreme Court issued two landmark decisions related to Brady on
cases that came out of his office during his tenure.86 In trial testimony
during Connick v. Thompson, Connick admitted that “there were at
least four published opinions reversing convictions secured during his
tenure [as district attorney] based on Brady violations, and he recog-
nized that judges’ disagreements with his prosecutors’ Brady violations
are not limited to published opinions.”87 During Connick’s tenure as
district attorney, his office obtained thirty-six capital convictions. In
nine of those convictions, courts found that evidence had been im-
properly suppressed in violation of Brady.88 Five of those nine defend-
ants have since been exonerated.89 Connick held the office of Orleans
Parish District Attorney from 1974 to 2003. According to the Louisi-
ana Secretary of State, Connick was reelected four times, many of
those reelections occurring after numerous reversals and exonera-
tions, even in capital cases.90
Bill Peterson, district attorney for Pontotoc County, Oklahoma,
notoriously secured the wrongful convictions of Ron Williamson and
Dennis Fritz through several forms of prosecutorial misconduct, in-
cluding at least one Brady violation.91 Williamson himself came within
five days of execution.92 In reversing Williamson’s murder conviction,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
found that Peterson violated Brady by suppressing a video recording of
a polygraph examination in which Williamson denied involvement in
the murder.93 As a result, Williamson’s counsel was unable to counter
several prosecution witnesses of suspect backgrounds and motives who
claimed Williamson had confessed his participation in the murder.
86. Kyles, 514 U.S. 419; Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350.
87. Brief of the Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 24,
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 09-571), 2010 WL 3232485 at *24.
88. Id. at 25.
89. Id.
90. Telephone Conversation with Anonymous, Records Dep’t, Office of the La. Sec’y
of State (Apr. 28, 2011).
91. Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1563–66 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
92. Know the Cases: Ron Williamson, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocencepro-
ject.org/Content/Ron_Williamson.php (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Ron
Williamson].
93. Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1563–64.
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Peterson’s transgressions compelled Judge Frank H. Seay to comment:
“God help us, if ever in this country we turn our heads while people
who have not had fair trials are executed. That almost happened in
this case.”94 DNA evidence eventually exonerated Williamson.95 In the
subsequent civil suit in which Peterson was a named defendant, the
court denied Peterson’s motion for summary judgment, noting:
[T]he circumstantial evidence indicates a concerted pattern by the
various investigators and Peterson to deprive Plaintiffs of one or
more of their constitutional rights. The repeated omission of ex-
culpatory evidence by investigators while including inculpatory evi-
dence, inclusion of debatably fabricated evidence, failure to follow
obvious and apparent leads which implicated other individuals,
and the use of questionable forensic conclusions suggests that the
involved Defendants were acting deliberately toward the specific
end result prosecution of Williamson and Fritz without regard to
the warning signs along the way that their end result was unjust
and not supported by the facts of their investigation.96
Peterson is believed to have adopted similar tactics to obtain at least
three other murder convictions, including that of Williamson’s al-
leged accomplice Fritz, who was also exonerated. All of this was
brought into the national spotlight when Peterson became the subject
of two non-fiction books, one of them written by famed novelist John
Grisham.97 Williamson and Fritz were exonerated on April 15, 1999.
Peterson was last reelected in 2006, before retiring in 2008.98
Kern County, California District Attorney Ed Jagels was spot-
lighted in the 2008 film Witch Hunt for his prosecution of twenty-six
individuals on child molestation charges in the 1980s.99 In these trials,
Jagels alleged that the accused variously drank blood, hung children
from hooks, and forced children to have sexual intercourse with their
parents.100 The only evidence against any of the exonerated consisted
94. Id. at 1577.
95. Ron Williamson, supra note 92.
96. Order on Defendant William N. Peterson’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 23,
Fritz v. City of Ada, No. CIV-00-194-D (E.D. Okla. Feb. 7, 2002); see also JOHN GRISHAM, THE
INNOCENT MAN 342 (Doubleday 2006).
97. See GRISHAM, supra note 96; ROBERT MAYER, THE DREAMS OF ADA 414–15 (1987).
98. Leo Kelley, Thomsen Throws Hat in District 25 Ring, ADA NEWS (May 16, 2006),
http://theadanews.com/local/x212571555/Thomsen-throws-hat-in-District-25-ring;
Brenda Tollett, Peterson to Retire as DA, ADA NEWS (Nov. 5, 2007), http://theadanews.com/
x212596671/Peterson-to-retire-as-DA.
99. WITCH HUNT (KTF Films 2008).
100. Garance Burke, Crusading Calif. D.A. Retires, Leaves Painful Wake, SEATTLE TIMES
(Nov. 14, 2009), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2010275768_apus-
crusadingprosecutor.html.
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of testimony by the alleged child victims.101 Pursuant to a request for
records related to an appeal by one of the accused, a box containing
evidence of the unreliability of the alleged victims accounts, including
evidence of improper coaching of the victims’ testimony, was turned
over to defense attorneys.102 Since their convictions, twenty-five of
those defendants have been exonerated.103 Two of those convicted by
Jagels were ultimately acquitted of fifty-two separate charges of child
molestation.104 Jagels has summed up his approach to the possibility
of his office prosecuting the innocent by stating: “Innocent people
may have been accused . . . but what I really fear is that perfectly legiti-
mate convictions have been overturned.”105 Jagels was reelected six
times until his retirement in 2010.106
Tulare County, California District Attorney Phillip Cline was an
assistant district attorney when he served as lead trial counsel in the
1986 prosecution of Mark Sodersten for murder. Sodersten was con-
victed and sentenced to life without parole, plus seven years. There
was no physical evidence linking Sodersten to the murder. Instead,
Cline wholly relied upon the testimony of two witnesses—a four year-
old girl and an adult who was high on PCP while he observed the
events that he testified to—which on appeal was found to be signifi-
cantly undermined by several audiotapes of prior interviews which
were suppressed in violation of Brady.107 Sodersten maintained his in-
nocence after conviction, serving twenty years in prison before dying
while incarcerated in 2006. The investigation and trial were riddled
with such flagrant police and prosecutorial misconduct that in 2007,
California’s Fifth District Court of Appeal granted Sodersten’s peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus despite the fact that the petitioner was
already dead, noting:
This case calls to account the American system of justice. For that
system to have credibility we must respond. As we shall explain,
what happened in this case has such an impact upon the integrity
and fairness that are the cornerstones of our criminal justice sys-
tem, that continued public confidence in that system requires us to
address the validity of petitioner’s conviction despite the fact we
can no longer provide a remedy for petitioner himself. To dis-
101. Stoll v. Cnty. of Kern, No. 1:1:05-CV-01059 OWW SMS, 2007 WL 2815032 (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 25, 2007).
102. WITCH HUNT, supra note 99.
103. Burke, supra note 100.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. In re Sodersten, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 586–99, 621–24 (Ct. App. 2007).
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charge this writ as moot would be a disservice to the legitimate
public expectation that judges will enforce justice. It would be a
disservice to justice. Most of all, it would be a disservice to peti-
tioner, who maintained his innocence despite a system that failed
him. We will not perpetuate that failure and let silence endorse
that result.108
Cline was appointed District Attorney of Tulare County in 1992. He
was reelected in 1994, and has been reelected four more times since
then, his latest victory occurring in 2010. He still holds that position at
the time of this writing.109
These are but a few examples of elected district attorneys who
have not been voted out of office in the wake of flagrant and/or re-
peated Brady violations. The reasons why voters have continued to sup-
port these district attorneys and others like them are unclear.
Whatever their rationale, one can infer that voters have largely not
seen fit to make this type of prosecutorial misconduct a determinative
issue in elections, even as high-profile exonerations have become
more frequent and drawn increasing media attention.
4. The Bottom Line on Brady
Because Brady is not applicable to cases ending in plea bargain, it
does not apply to the vast majority of criminal prosecutions in the
United States. Even when applicable, prosecutorial compliance with
Brady has been rendered essentially moot by the high standard a de-
fendant is compelled to meet in order to obtain a reversal and the
near complete lack of discipline of prosecutors who violate Brady. As a
result, prosecutorial compliance with Brady has been rendered effec-
tively voluntary. As such, the protections Brady appears to offer crimi-
nal defendants against wrongful conviction are hollow and
meaningless.
B. The Brady Rule is the Primary Cause of Wrongful Convictions
Although the Supreme Court has held that Brady does not re-
quire a prosecutor to “deliver his entire file to defense counsel,”110 the
persistence and pervasiveness of wrongful convictions within the crim-
inal justice system demand such reforms. As discussed supra, the cur-
rent construction of the Brady rule is ineffective in preventing
prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence, especially with re-
108. Id. at 577.
109. OFF. TULARE COUNTY DISTRICT ATT’Y, http://www.da-tulareco.org/ (last visited
Feb. 25, 2012).
110. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
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spect to wrongful convictions. As discussed infra, the criminal justice
system’s continued adherence to Brady could be said to be the primary
cause of wrongful convictions.
In order to determine the impact of the Brady rule on wrongful
convictions, the nature of wrongful convictions themselves must first
be considered. In an abstract sense, one can assume that where a
wrongful conviction exists, there must exist some evidence of that per-
son’s innocence, whether or not it is ever discovered by anyone associ-
ated with the case. One way or the other, that evidence is necessarily
somewhere in the world. Due to many factors—chief among them the
relative allocation of resources of prosecutors and law enforcement
versus the resources of public defenders and appointed defense coun-
sel—the people most likely to discover such evidence are police and
prosecutors charged with doing the majority of the investigative work
on any given criminal case. Where wrongful convictions have oc-
curred, it is usually the case that police and prosecutors had knowl-
edge or possession of such evidence during the prosecution of the
case, whether or not they realized it at the time.
Most of the scholarship that has sought to determine how wrong-
ful convictions occur has attempted to identify categorized “causes” of
wrongful conviction in the form of particular recurring acts, incidents,
or phenomena.111 These causes include but are not limited to: false or
coerced confessions, police and prosecutorial “tunnel vision,” false or
mistaken eyewitness testimony, perjured testimony, “snitch” testi-
mony, and flawed or false forensic evidence. The suppression of excul-
patory evidence is generally considered to be its own “cause” of
wrongful convictions for the purposes of categorization, but that view
overlooks the fact that where each of these other causes of wrongful
conviction occur, police and prosecutors almost always have within
their knowledge or possession information suggesting the existence of
one of these causes.112 It is arguable that such evidence could under-
mine other inculpatory evidence and could potentially sway a jury to a
different outcome at trial. Thus, evidence which tends to show the
presence of one of the known causes of wrongful convictions could be
considered “material” under Brady and would require disclosure. Even
if one does not agree that such evidence is material under any con-
strual of Brady itself, the fact of the matter is that the current construc-
tion of the Brady rule does not necessarily require disclosure of these
111. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987).
112. See id.
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categories of evidence that have been shown to lead to wrongful con-
victions. This problem is exacerbated by the problems of the applica-
bility and enforcement of Brady discussed supra. Were prosecutors
subjected to more stringent criminal discovery standards in criminal
cases, it is likely that the presence of one of these causes could be
detected and remedied before a wrongful conviction occurs. Viewed
in this light, the criminal justice system’s continued adherence to
Brady could be said to be the primary cause of wrongful convictions.
Hypothetically, it may be the case that, in the instance of a defen-
dant who is factually guilty, evidence of the existence of one of the
causes of wrongful conviction is not indicative of innocence. In the
case of a factually innocent defendant, however, such evidence is nec-
essarily indicative of the innocence of the defendant. In the real
world, it may be impossible to know with certainty whether a defen-
dant is actually guilty or innocent prior to or during an investigation,
and one could argue that disclosure of all such evidence would likely
make prosecutions needlessly difficult and allow guilty defendants to
go free. The growing trend of state and local jurisdictions which have
voluntarily adopted open discovery practices belies this concern, how-
ever. Further, the extent of the problem of wrongful convictions sug-
gests that the current rules under which this type of exculpatory
evidence is disclosed do not adequately address the problem. While
there is no definitive list of the “causes” of wrongful conviction, the
most commonly cited “causes” are addressed in turn below.
1. Mistaken or False Eyewitness Identification
Although estimates vary regarding the percentages of wrongful
convictions which can be attributed to each “cause” of wrongful con-
victions listed here, it is generally acknowledged that eyewitness mis-
identification is associated with more wrongful convictions than any
other “cause.”113 One study of murder and rape exonerations from
1989 through 2003 found that eyewitness misidentification was in-
volved in 50% of murder exonerations and 88% of rape exonera-
tions.114 A study by the Justice Project found that eyewitness
113. JUSTICE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A POLICY REVIEW 2 (2007), available
at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~glwells/The_Justice%20Project_Eyewitness_Identi-
fication_%20A_Policy_Review.pdf [hereinafter EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION].
114. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 544 (2005).
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misidentification was involved in 75% of all post-conviction DNA ex-
onerations in the United States.115
Mistaken or false eyewitness identification of a defendant in a
criminal investigation usually results from unreliable procedures in
administering live suspect lineups and photo arrays.116 Although the
United States Department of Justice and the Justice Project have both
set forth procedural recommendations for increasing the reliability of
traditional eyewitness identification techniques, those reforms have
not been consistently implemented by the myriad law enforcement
agencies in the United States.117
Where photo spreads of suspects or lineups of live suspects are
presented to witnesses in a flawed manner, evidence of those flaws will
be known to the police, if not the prosecution also. Police and prose-
cutors are in the best position to know of or have in their possession
evidence of the inaccuracy of the eyewitness identification of the de-
fendant, whether that flaw is rooted in the witness’ perception or in
the procedures used by the police in obtaining the identification.
That evidence is by definition exculpatory. Because so many wrongful
convictions since Brady have involved eyewitness misidentification
where such information was not disclosed, the claim that the current
construction of the Brady rule is the primary cause of wrongful convic-
tions is justified by the numbers associated with eyewitness misidentifi-
cation alone.
2. False or Coerced Confessions
Typically, false confessions are the product of police interroga-
tion. With respect to police practices, an “interrogation” can be differ-
entiated from an “interview” based on the respective goals of the
procedures.118 “[P]olice are trained to interview” those who they be-
lieve to be innocent, such as witnesses and victims.119 Only those sus-
pected of being guilty are subject to “interrogation.”120
As shown by Richard A. Leo in his book Police Interrogation and
American Justice, the presumption of guilt on the part of the police in
the interrogation process often leads to intense pressure on suspects
115. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, supra note 113.
116. See generally id.
117. Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TECHNICAL WORKING GRP. FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE,
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf.
118. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 21–22 (2008).
119. Id. at 22.
120. Id. at 21–22.
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to confess to crimes.121 As noted by Leo, “modern methods of psycho-
logical interrogation have been designed to break down a suspect’s
denials of guilt by persuading him that he has no meaningful choice
under the circumstances but to comply with detectives, and that con-
trary to all appearances, logic, and common sense, he is better off by
confessing.”122 The tactics used to implement this strategy vary, but
have historically included lying to suspects, extended periods of con-
finement with no promise of release, and even torture.123
Whether or not these pressures rise to the level of coercion, such
pressures can result in false confessions. False confessions seldom
completely match the other facts and physical evidence of an investi-
gation. Still, there are many well-documented cases of the failure of
police and prosecutors heed to these disparities.124 The result is that a
false confession can be used as powerful evidence against the accused,
often outweighing even physical evidence of a defendant’s innocence
in the eyes of a jury.
In their book The Wrong Guys, Tom Wells and Richard A. Leo
outline the story of the “Norfolk Four,” four men who falsely con-
fessed to a brutal rape-murder they had nothing to do with and who
were each found not to be the source of the true perpetrator’s DNA
before trial or guilty plea.125 Rather than consider the innocence of
the defendants, each negative DNA test prompted police and prosecu-
tors to change their theory of the case to conclude that all were in-
volved and that the biological evidence at the scene must have come
from another accomplice who had not yet been apprehended.126 This
constantly evolving theory eventually led to the arrest of eight sus-
pects, ending only when a DNA match was found.127 The four confes-
sors were all convicted or pled guilty, the false confessions being the
only evidence implicating them in the crime.128
The prosecutors in the Norfolk Four case were aware of the repu-
tation of the lead detective on the case for employing harsh tactics in
121. Id.
122. Id. at 25.
123. See id.; see also Monica Davey & Emma Graves Fitzsimmons, Officer Accused of Torture
Is Guilty of Perjury, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, at A20.
124. See generally TOM WELLS & RICHARD A. LEO, THE WRONG GUYS: MURDER, FALSE
CONFESSIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008); GRISHAM, supra note 96; THE THIN BLUE LINE
(American Playhouse et al. 1988).
125. WELLS & LEO, supra note 124.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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conducting interrogations.129 They were also aware of the fact that the
confessions were inconsistent in relation to one another, inconsistent
in relation to the physical evidence, and internally inconsistent (often
changing as police interrogators fed the suspects information).130 The
prosecutors were also aware that seven innocent suspects took poly-
graph tests denying their involvement, and all seven were told by po-
lice interrogators that they had failed.131 At least three of these
suspects either passed the tests or the results were inconclusive.132
When a confession is involved in a criminal investigation, a care-
ful examination of the circumstances under which the confession was
obtained, as well as the extent to which the confession is consistent
with other facts and evidence in the case, is necessary to determine
the validity of the confession.133 Such a determination is impossible to
make without access to all the information known to the prosecution
in a given case. The exonerations of the Norfolk Four and Ron Wil-
liamson illustrate this point. When all such information did become
known to appellate attorneys and others, the basis of validity of the
confessions was destroyed and the convictions reversed. Had this pro-
cess occurred earlier, the defendants would likely have been spared
the ordeal of years of wrongful imprisonment. Even if it were the case
that there were no documentary evidence of the unreliability of the
confessions given in these cases, however, police and prosecutors in
these cases were fully aware of the means employed to obtain the con-
fessions and the inconsistency of the confessions with the facts and
other evidence. That knowledge, if communicated to defense counsel,
constitutes exculpatory evidence.
3. Perjured Testimony and “Snitch” Testimony
The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors may not use testi-
mony they know to be perjured to obtain a conviction.134 To do so
would be a violation of even the current construction of the Brady
rule. However, the use of informants in providing inculpatory testi-
mony for the prosecution (commonly known as “snitch” testimony)
frequently blurs the line between knowingly perjured testimony and
testimony which is simply unreliable.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 23, 67, 105, 148, 159, 161, 177.
132. Id. at 23, 67, 105.
133. See generally Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and
Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479.
134. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (per curiam).
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Government informants, including inmates and non-incarcerated
informants, often have severely suspect or personal motives for testify-
ing in criminal prosecutions. These motivations can range from leni-
ent treatment in a prosecution targeting them to actual monetary
payment.135 In any case of snitch testimony, the government is neces-
sarily in possession, or at least aware of, any offers made to the inform-
ant intended to procure their testimony. Any information suggesting
that an informant received any kind of reward from the prosecution
or other government agency in return for their testimony is inherently
exculpatory as it casts doubt on the motivation of the witness in so
testifying.
The fact that prosecutors are more likely than any other figure
involved in a criminal prosecution to know how the informant came
to know the information forming the basis of his or her testimony is
important as well. Informants often claim that a defendant confessed
guilt to the crime of which they are accused.136 Informants are also
sometimes purposely placed by prosecutors and law enforcement in
close proximity to defendants who are incarcerated in the hopes of
gaining information.137 This was the case in the examples of both Ron
Williamson and the Norfolk Four, respectively.
Such information would tend to cast doubt on the testimony of
informant witnesses and as such can be considered exculpatory evi-
dence. Yet, because most of the circumstances of informant testimony
do not directly point to the innocence of the defendant, most of the
information regarding those circumstances is generally not turned
over to defense counsel. The result can be devastating to a wrongfully
accused defendant. Informant witnesses who would otherwise be re-
garded with no credibility (especially if already incarcerated for an-
other crime) are given credibility in the eyes of the jury simply by the
fact that the prosecution presents such testimony and the court allows
it. This is the case whether or not the prosecution discloses an inform-
ant’s conviction history and any offers made in exchange for testi-
mony as required by law.
135. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE 27–29 (2009).
136. See, e.g., id.; see GRISHAM, supra note 96, at 164–66, 203; JUSTICE PROJECT, JAILHOUSE
SNITCH TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW (2007).
137. See WELLS & LEO, supra note 124, at 96–97, 166.
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4. Flawed Forensic Evidence
In 2009, the National Research Council of the National Acade-
mies published a review of the state of forensic science in the United
States.138 Of particular note among the Council’s findings were that
there are no national standards for the collection, analysis, and han-
dling of forensic evidence, and that DNA evidence is the only method
of forensic science that “has been rigorously shown to have the capac-
ity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a
connection between evidence and a specific or individual source.”139
The last several decades have witnessed a revolution in the types
of forensic science which are accepted as being sufficiently credible as
to warrant submission as evidence in a criminal trial. While DNA has
come to be known as the gold standard, other forms of forensic sci-
ence, such as forensic hair analysis, while once accepted as reliable,
have now been generally discredited by the scientific community.140
Some of these methods, such as bullet lead analysis, were developed
exclusively by law enforcement agencies and not by the greater scien-
tific community.141 In addition, forensics laboratories generally work
directly under the supervision of law enforcement agencies in the ju-
risdiction in which they are located, drawing the objectivity of their
findings into question.142 All of these problems are exacerbated by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
in which the Court held that trial judges may accept expert testimony
on scientific evidence that is not generally accepted by the scientific
community.143
The end result of all these issues related to forensic evidence is
that courts have frequently admitted dubious forensic evidence in
criminal cases and have allowed such evidence to be presented in a
way as to overstate the reliability and accuracy of those findings. Infor-
mation casting doubt on the reliability of forensic evidence presented
in a case is by definition exculpatory. If such information exists, it is
necessarily in the possession of prosecution and law enforcement offi-
138. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCI-
ENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL].
139. Id. at 6–7.
140. Id. at 155–61.
141. See 60 Minutes: Evidence of Injustice, CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2007/11/16/60minutes/main3512453.shtml.
142. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 138, at 183–91.
143. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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cials who process such evidence and have full and complete knowl-
edge of the methods and practices used in promulgating it.
5. Police and Prosecutorial “Tunnel Vision”
Even the absence of evidence or information can sometimes be
indicative of a defendant’s factual innocence. When police and prose-
cutors focus on one suspect early in an investigation, for example, and
do not pursue other leads or suspects, such an absence is valuable
information to defense counsel. In the case of a wrongful conviction
involving tunnel vision, exculpatory evidence would only be present in
the form of an absence of evidence of police and prosecutorial investi-
gation of other suspects and other theories of a crime. Commentators
on wrongful convictions refer to these processes as “tunnel vision” and
“confirmation bias.”144
Richard A. Leo describes tunnel vision as “the tendency to ‘focus
on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will “build a case” for
conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away
from guilt.’”145 This process is rooted in confirmation bias, the psy-
chological tendency of all human beings to “seek out and interpret
evidence in ways that support existing beliefs, perceptions, and expec-
tations, and to avoid or reject evidence that does not.”146
Because determining whether prosecutorial “tunnel vision” exists
involves proving a negative, there is no way to determine whether it is
a factor in an investigation without full knowledge of the information
available to the police and prosecution in a given case. In order to
show that leads were not followed or simply ignored, for example, one
would necessarily need access to all the information gathered by inves-
tigating authorities. Since evidence having to do with other suspects
could easily not meet the standard set forth in Kyles v. Whitley because
it does not bear directly on the defendant, such information would
not have to be disclosed to defense counsel. As a result, it is generally
impossible for such a determination to be made by defense counsel
under the current construction of Brady. Yet, if tunnel vision could be
proven based on documentary evidence, or if it is in the knowledge of
the police or prosecution that their investigation prematurely focused
144. LEO, supra note 118, at 263–64.
145. Id. at 263 (quoting Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the “Laboratory” of
Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC
L. REV. 847, 847–64 (2002)).
146. Id. at 263–64.
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on one suspect to the detriment of other leads or suspects, that infor-
mation or knowledge would, by definition, be exculpatory.
C. “Open File” Discovery
While “open file” discovery may seem like a radical departure
from tradition with respect to American criminal procedure, its basic
tenets are hardly new or revolutionary in American law. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, endow civil defendants with
extensive discovery rights limited mainly by the attorney-client and
work product privileges of the plaintiff.147 Given the respective liberty
interests at stake for civil and criminal defendants (and the Brady
rule’s ineffectiveness in preventing wrongful convictions), it makes
sense that criminal defendants be afforded discovery rights that meet
or exceed those afforded civil defendants whose personal liberty is not
at risk in litigation. Of course, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not perfectly address all of the special concerns and interests unique
to criminal practice. However, state and local jurisdictions that have
instituted some form of open file discovery have demonstrated that
civil-style discovery can be effectively and safely adapted to meet the
needs of criminal practice.
Criminal discovery practices across the United States are consis-
tent only in their inconsistency. The amount of discovery information
a defendant in a criminal case is afforded varies from one jurisdiction
to the next. While Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue (includ-
ing Brady) sets the minimum for what must be provided to a defen-
dant as required by the Constitution, some state and local authorities
such as state legislatures and individual district attorneys have seen fit
to adopt more stringent rules of prosecutorial disclosure in response
to many of the issues discussed here. Still, these decisions by state and
local authorities are voluntary and may be revoked at any time. Fur-
ther, the voluntary nature of such disclosure policies provides no guar-
antee to defendants that prosecutors have disclosed everything since
there is no independent, disciplinary authority enforcing such
policies.
Further, the federal constitutional requirements of criminal dis-
covery, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and most state codes
of criminal procedure lag behind even the non-binding American Bar
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the
147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (encompassing discovery rules in general); FED R. CIV. P.
26(b)(3) (protecting work-product).
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amount of disclosure required of prosecutors. ABA Model Rule 3.8(d)
requires that prosecutors:
[M]ake timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or informa-
tion known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentenc-
ing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of
the tribunal . . . .148
The ABA Model Rules also impose requirements on prosecutors to
remedy a conviction later learned to have been obtained wrongfully
or in error through direct action.149
1. Proposed General Procedures150
a. Baseline Rule
The prosecution in a criminal case shall be required to disclose, to
the defense and to the court, all non-privileged evidence and infor-
mation related to a criminal case (whether inculpatory, exculpa-
tory, or neutral), in a timely fashion prior to any trial or guilty plea.
This rule shall extend to all evidence and information in the actual
or constructive possession of any law enforcement agency involved
in investigating the case. This requirement shall be ongoing
throughout the duration of a case.
A broad policy of disclosure in criminal cases is the central com-
ponent of open file discovery. It is particularly important that this dis-
closure requirement be applicable prior to the entering of a guilty
plea due to the high volume of cases that never go to trial and the
Supreme Court-sanctioned practices of plea bargaining as set forth in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes.151
The State of Ohio, for example, recently issued sweeping reforms
to its criminal discovery rules at the urging of the Ohio Innocence
148. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2002).
149. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g)–(h) (2010).
150. While the following proposals represent only the most basic principles of an open-
file discovery system, the Justice Project’s “Model Bill for Expanded Discovery In Criminal
Cases” is an excellent comprehensive example of what such a system of discovery rules
would look like and is largely drawn from the American Bar Association’s Standards for
Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury Standard 11 and North Carolina General Statutes
sections 15A-905, 15A-911 to 15A-915. JUSTICE PROJECT, EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL
CASES: A POLICY REVIEW 27 n.84 (2007), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploaded
Files/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Death_penalty_reform/Expanded%20discovery%20
policy%20brief.pdf [hereinafter EXPANDED DISCOVERY]; see AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY, Standard 11 (3d ed. 1996); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 15A-905, 15A-911 to -915 (2004).
151. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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Project.152 Prior to the adoption of the new rules, Ohio prosecutors
were not even required to turn over police reports or witness state-
ments prior to trial.153 While Ohio’s new rules do not require total
disclosure of all information known to the prosecution, they do re-
quire disclosure of a large amount of material beyond that which is
“favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or punishment.”154 It
is important to note that this policy decision by the Ohio legislature
was driven by concern over wrongful convictions.155 To that end, the
reforms also mandate that police employ “double-blind” procedures
when asking eyewitnesses to identify suspects and require that confes-
sions be videotaped in cases of serious crimes.156 Ohio is the most
recent example of a state moving toward more open criminal discov-
ery practices, but there are others. North Carolina is noteworthy as
having fully adopted open-file discovery in 2004. Florida, Colorado,
New Jersey, and Arizona have also adopted some aspects of broadened
criminal discovery practices.157 While each system varies in the means
and degrees of disclosure, each goes beyond what is required by the
Constitution as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court. Still,
such policies have not been implemented consistently throughout the
United States. As a result, the fairness of a criminal proceeding may
depend in large part on where the crime occurred.
b. Protective Orders
On a determination of good cause by the court, any party may be
granted a protective order covering information, exhibits, or wit-
nesses where security, confidentiality, or the safety of a witness is a
concern prior to trial or guilty plea.
In criminal cases, prosecutors may have valid concerns over secur-
ity, safety, and confidentiality. A witness who risks retaliation for testi-
fying against a defendant or the jeopardization of another criminal
investigation are just two examples. As such, the open file discovery
requirements of disclosure may allow for the limited and temporary
suppression of evidence on a determination of good cause by the
court. Protective orders are a time-honored and effective tool for pro-
tecting sensitive information in both criminal and civil litigation. The
152. Janice Morse, Ohio’s New Criminal Court Rules Kick In, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 1,
2010.
153. Id.
154. OHIO CRIM. R. 16(B)(5).
155. Morse, supra note 152.
156. Id. See generally EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, supra note 113.
157. EXPANDED DISCOVERY, supra note 150.
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ABA Model Rules and states that have moved toward open file discov-
ery generally allow this procedure to be used to protect such
information.158
The most important benefit of a rule where information related
to a case can only be legally suppressed pursuant to a protective order
is that it makes the judge, not the prosecutor, the arbiter of what evi-
dence is fit for disclosure. Under the current construction of the Brady
rule, the prosecutor is generally left to determine what evidence meets
the Brady standard of materiality requiring disclosure. As discussed be-
low, prosecutors are ill-equipped due to their roles as partisan advo-
cates to objectively make such a determination.
c. Depositions
Both the prosecution and the defense, upon request, are entitled
to conduct sworn depositions of any witness including any law en-
forcement personnel involved in the investigation of a case. This
rule excludes the defendant, defense attorneys and staff, and any
witness who is a valid claimant of a recognized privilege. Prosecu-
tion attorneys and staff may only be subject to deposition upon a
judicial finding of a bad faith violation of the disclosure require-
ments of these rules.
Depositions are universally used in civil litigation to bring the
facts of a case out prior to trial and to determine how witnesses will
testify at trial. Because they are conducted under oath, depositions
also provide a way to prevent witnesses from changing their testimony
and committing perjury at trial. Depositions are especially important
with respect to wrongful convictions because they would allow defense
counsel to elicit exculpatory information, which may only exist in the
knowledge of relevant law enforcement personnel, such as flaws in
forensic science or eyewitness identification procedures.
Florida’s system of criminal discovery is notable for allowing the
defense in criminal cases to conduct depositions of witnesses and law
enforcement personnel for over forty years.159 Florida’s rule is also
unique in that it allows the prosecution to conduct depositions of de-
fense witnesses as well,160 as does Colorado.161
158. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d)(g) (2010); OHIO CRIM. R. 16(D).
159. EXPANDED DISCOVERY, supra note 150, at 15–16.
160. Id. at 16.
161. Id.
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2. Enforcement
For any system of criminal discovery to be effective, stringent
methods of enforcement must be put in place and strictly adhered to.
As discussed above, the lack of meaningful enforcement of the Brady
rule is as much a part of the problem of the current construction of
the rule as the inapplicability of the rule in plea bargain cases and the
high standard the defendant must meet for reversal of conviction af-
ter trial. The problem with the current regime of enforcement of the
Brady rule is not that mechanisms of enforcement do not exist—the
problem is that those mechanisms are either generally ineffective or
not effectively employed. In contrast, attorneys in civil cases who are
found to have wrongfully suppressed discoverable materials are fre-
quently subject to severe sanctions, including referral to a state bar
association and possibly disbarment.162
Given the enormous power and discretion entrusted to prosecu-
tors in the American criminal justice system, the harshest measures of
enforcement possible should be used to punish prosecutorial discov-
ery violations made in bad faith. Where a prosecutor intentionally sup-
presses evidence of the innocence of a defendant—as was likely the
case in Connick v. Thompson163—that action represents a gross perver-
sion of the responsibilities and trust placed in the prosecuting attor-
ney by the courts and the public. Further, the consequences of such
misconduct are so serious (years of imprisonment or even death) that
harsh remedies are justified. Although the courts have occasionally
relied on criminal contempt charges to sanction attorneys who violate
Brady in bad faith, the rarity of such action and the nominal punish-
ments typically imposed have hardly served as a deterrent to such be-
havior. Effective deterrence of the prosecutorial suppression of
exculpatory evidence in bad faith likely requires the drafting of new
statutes which reflect the seriousness of such behavior. These statutes
should include penalties that reflect the actual harm done to a defen-
dant through the offending prosecutor’s willful action—including
lengthy prison sentences. Beyond criminal penalties, bad faith sup-
pression of exculpatory evidence should also result in automatic dis-
barment and disqualification of the prosecutor from the protection of
absolute immunity from any civil suit filed by an exonerated
defendant.
162. See Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
163. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1368 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Even in cases where bad faith is not present, however, the severity
of potential harm to innocent defendants requires that failure to com-
ply with discovery rules be treated seriously. While the suppression of
discoverable material may not be the result of willful misconduct,
under the policy reforms proposed above, the prosecution would have
a duty to take measures to ensure that all information relevant to a
given case information is disclosed. At the trial level, judges should
not hesitate to issue a continuance or declare a mistrial in the event of
suppression that is the result of a good faith mistake or error. In par-
ticularly egregious cases, judicial sanctions and/or referral of the of-
fending attorney to the relevant state bar authority should be standard
procedure. At the appellate level, the “deprivation of a fair trial” stan-
dard articulated in Kyles and Bagley should be thrown out, and a retrial
granted in any case where the prosecution can be shown to have com-
mitted any sort of significant discovery violation at trial. In addition,
appellate courts should be empowered to appoint special prosecutors
to probe a finding of bad faith suppression on the part of the
prosecution.
Finally, Congress should pass legislation overruling Connick v.
Thompson and mandate civil liability on a theory of gross negligence
for prosecutorial agencies, municipalities, and state governments tol-
erant of a culture of discovery violations resulting in wrongful convic-
tions. This measure would reflect the need for accountability at the
organizational level and offer the accused some way to recover from
the state for the actions of its employees in wrongfully punishing an
individual for a crime he or she did not commit.
3. Policy Considerations
In United States v. Berger, the Supreme Court outlined the role
prosecutors are expected to play in the criminal justice system:
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impar-
tially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
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calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.164
This quote demonstrates that prosecutors are asked to perform
not one, but two roles in the American system of criminal justice: par-
tisan advocate for conviction and objective “minister of justice.”165
The eloquent words of Justice Sutherland quoted above fail to recog-
nize that the prosecutor’s dual role contains an incurable conflict of
interest. While prosecutors are expected to act as objective ministers
of justice ensuring that justice is doled out in a fair manner, they are
also expected to act as partisan advocates whose job performance and
careers are often judged exclusively on their ability to convict defend-
ants. Compounding this problem, the current construction of the
Brady rule and its corresponding lack of penalties for violations pro-
vide no incentive for prosecutors to perform the objective “minister of
justice” function with respect to exculpatory evidence.
Open file discovery largely removes prosecutors from this inher-
ently conflicted dual role and allows them to act almost exclusively as
partisan advocates for the state—free to make the case for conviction
on a level playing field with a defendant who is fully informed of the
evidence in the case. While prosecutors would still have wide discre-
tion as ministers of justice in deciding which cases to prosecute, prose-
cutors would not be asked to act as impartial discovery referees in a
dispute in which they have a vested personal interest. In short, Berger
and Brady ask prosecutors to carry out an impossible task. Open file
discovery removes this burden.
Beyond freeing prosecutors from Berger’s dual role, open file dis-
covery would also likely result in a substantial reduction in costs, both
social and financial. It would greatly increase the efficiency of the
courts and the penological system, both of which are already strapped
for resources. By enhancing the truth-finding function of the courts
and ensuring early disclosure of inculpatory evidence, open file dis-
covery would do much to induce guilty defendants to plead guilty,
thus avoiding the drain on resources associated with unnecessary tri-
als. Open file discovery would also result in financial savings by keep-
ing innocent individuals out of prisons, jails, and other forms of
correctional supervision, all of which are publicly financed. In 2009,
for example, one national survey estimated that the average cost of
incarcerating a prisoner for one year to be $29,000.166 As illustrated by
164. United States v. Berger, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
165. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2002).
166. ONE IN 31, supra note 5, at 12. R
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the estimates of the number of individuals wrongfully convicted in the
United States above, these costs are hardly nominal.
Wrongful convictions also result in substantial social costs that
the use of open file discovery would greatly reduce. The impact of
being wrongfully convicted often results in effects on the life of the
wrongfully convicted individual, which can never be fully remedied.
These effects range from physical and mental trauma resulting from
imprisonment, adverse effects on an individual’s career, family life
and financial well-being, as well as the social stigma of being perceived
as a criminal even after exoneration. Open file discovery also has the
added benefit of minimizing the chance that the true perpetrator of a
crime for which someone else has been punished will remain free to
commit further crimes.
Finally, open file discovery would strengthen public confidence
in the criminal justice system and the legitimacy of its results. It is
assumed by most that if an accused is innocent of a crime, that inno-
cence will be established and the accused set free. Under the current
construction of Brady, that is all too often not the case. Wrongful con-
victions occur with shocking regularity and can occur even when the
prosecution has definitive evidence of the defendant’s innocence.167
Wrongful convictions adversely affect the perception of legitimacy and
fairness of the criminal justice system in the eyes of the public, and
through it, the government itself. Open file discovery would
strengthen public confidence in the criminal justice system and the
legitimacy of its results.
Conclusion
When innocence itself is brought to the bar and condemned, espe-
cially to die . . . [t]hen, the subject will exclaim, “Whether I behave
well or ill is of no account; for virtue itself is no security.” And if
such an idea as that takes hold in the mind of the subject, that
would be the end of all security whatsoever.168
—John Adams, Rex v. Wemms
The Brady rule has been tested as a means of ensuring the fair-
ness of trials and preventing wrongful convictions for nearly fifty years.
All of the available data suggests that it has failed to accomplish those
goals. Given the scale of this failure and the massive costs—both social
167. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350.
168. JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS, SCIENCE, AND THE BATTLE AGAINST
MISIDENTIFICATION 203 (2005) (quoting JOHN ADAMS, Argument for the Defense in Rex v.
Wemms (1770), in 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 242 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel
eds., 1965)).
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and financial—associated with it, Congress, state legislatures, and the
courts should undertake extensive reforms of criminal discovery prac-
tice. An open file criminal discovery policy based on civil discovery
practice would reflect the magnitude of the interests at stake in crimi-
nal proceedings for both the defendant and society at large, and do
much to minimize the significant costs associated with Brady’s failure
to protect the innocent.
